By Walden Bello*
Bangkok--July 24. The collapse on Monday of the
Doha Round of World Trade Organization negotiations in Geneva is one of the
best things to happen to the developing world in a long while.
In the past two weeks, in anticipation of the July 27-28 meeting of the World
Trade Organization's General Council, a major rescue effort was mounted to save
the "Doha Round" of global trade negotiations from collapse. The most
prominent of these efforts took place at the Group of Eight Summit in St.
Petersburg, where the leaders of the world's most powerful economies called for
a successful conclusion to the round, painting it as a "historic
opportunity to generate economic growth, create potential for development, and
raise living standards across the world."
This was pure myth. The idea that the Doha Round is a "development
round" could not be farther from the truth.
At the very outset of the Doha negotiations in November 2001, the developed
country governments rejected the demand of the majority of countries that the
talks focus on the hard task of implementing past commitments and avoid
initiating a new round of trade liberalization. From the very start, the aim of
the developed countries was to push for greater market openings from the
developing countries while making minimal concessions on their part. Invoking
development was simply a cynical ploy to make the process less unpalatable.
LOPSIDED NEGOTIATIONS IN AGRICULTURE:
The state of the agricultural negotiations before today's unraveling was
reflective of this. Even if the United States had conceded to the terms of WTO
Director General's compromise on cutting its domestic support, this would still
have left it with a massive $20 billion worth of allowable subsidies. Even with
the European Union agreeing to phase out its export subsidies, this would still
have left it with 55 billion euros in other forms of export support. In return
for such minimal concessions, the US, EU, and other developed countries wanted
radically reduced tariffs for their agricultural exports in developing country
markets.
Indeed, even at a very late stage in the negotiations, the US appeared
determined to eliminate any protection for developing country farmers. US Trade
Representative Susan Schwab attacked the provisions for "special
products" and "special safeguard mechanisms" already
institutionalized in the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial declaration.
Admittedly imperfect, these mechanisms would nevertheless allow governments to
slow down the erosion of local agriculture by exempting some products from
tariff cuts and raising tariffs on subsidized imports.
The WTO negotiations, if brought to a conclusion on such lopsided terms, would
result in the slashing of poor countries' farm tariffs while preventing them
from maintaining food security. This is a recipe for massively expanded hunger
and threatens to further impoverish hundreds of millions of the poor worldwide.
The consequences for the South were perhaps best summed up by a Philippine
government negotiator before the WTO Agriculture Committee: "Our
agricultural sectors that are strategic to food security and rural employment
have already been destabilized as our small producers are being slaughtered by
the gross unfairness of the international trading environment. Even as I speak,
our small producers are being slaughtered in our own markets, [and] even the
more resilient and efficient are in distress."
THE SPECTER OF DEINDUSTRIALIZATION:
But the developed countries not only want radically reduced agricultural
tariffs from developing countries. They also want maximum entry to southern
markets for their industrial and other non-agricultural goods. In the NAMA
(Non-Agricultural Market Access) negotiations, they have demanded that the
industrializing economies of the South cut their non-agricultural tariffs by
60-70 per cent while offering to cut theirs by only 20-30 per cent. This not
only violates the GATT-WTO principle of less-than-full-reciprocity. It is
absurdly inequitable. The South African government reflected the frustrations
of most of the global South about the Doha process when it stated that
"developing countries will not agree to destroy their domestic industry on
the basis of unreasonable and irrational demands placed on them by the
developed countries."
The extinction of agriculture and deindustrialization is not the only price
that developing countries are being asked to pay for a successful conclusion to
the Doha Round. In addition, under the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) negotiations in the WTO, they are being asked to allow foreign
corporations more rights to buy and control public services in developing
countries, at the expense of guaranteeing essential public services for the
poor.
THE COST-BENEFIT EQUATION:
It is no longer just the developing countries or global civil society that is
warning that WTO-managed liberalization will be detrimental to the interests of
the developing world. Even the most pro-liberalization agencies are now
admitting that the benefits of the Doha Round to the poor have been greatly
inflated. According to a fall 2005 study by the World Bank, in a "likely
Doha scenario" of reforms, developing countries would gain a mere $16 billion
in ten years. That's a miniscule 0.16 percent of developing-country gross
domestic product, or less than a penny a day per capita. The poorest billion
people are projected to increase incomes by a mere $2 per year. That's why it
is so heartbreaking to see "the poor" being invoked to sell the
project of massive corporate expansion of the Doha agenda.
Yet the 2005 World Bank study, though less unrealistic than that agency's
previous studies, is extremely inadequate, for it does not factor in many costs
that the WTO regime imposes on developing countries. It fails to account, for
instance, for the negative impact of corporate patent monopolies under the
WTO's "Trade-Related Intellectual Property" agreement, which force
the poor to pay vastly increased prices for access to life-saving medicines.
Some estimate that these costs to developing countries are far greater than any
alleged gains from liberalization. For example, a recent United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) study predicts that the losses in
tariff income for developing countries under Doha could range between $32
billion and $63 billion annually. This loss in government revenues - the source
of developing-country health care, education, water provision, and sanitation
budgets - is two to four times the mere $16 billion in benefits projected by
the World Bank.
Africa, the least developed region, will be one of the most prominent victims
should the round be concluded successfully. Summing up the findings of other
recent research from the Carnegie Endowment, the European Commission, and the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Aileen Kwa of Focus on the Global
South points out that "the majority in Africa will be faced with losses in
both agriculture and industrial goods liberalization. Even if agricultural
export markets were open to Africa, the majority of African farmers -
subsistence farmers - will not be in a position to compete. In addition, they
will lose through having to open their domestic markets in the negotiations. The
poorest countries in Africa will be worst hit - many are LDC countries in
Sub-Saharan or East Africa."
BREAKING OUT OF THE WTO PARADIGM:
In sum, not only do the economic costs of a potential Doha conclusion clearly
outweigh any projected benefits to the poor; the loss of policy space for
developing countries - to create jobs through industrialization, guarantee
public services, and protect farmers and food security - would be tantamount to
kicking away the ladder of development, to use the image of Cambridge
University economist Ha Joon Chang, and prevent developing nations from using
the very tools used by developed nations to pull themselves out of poverty.
So clearly detrimental to development is free trade that a recent study of the
United Nations Developing Program (UNDP) advised poor Asian countries to do
what Japan and South Korea did successfully: protect key industries with
tariffs before exposing them to foreign competition. To promote development and
reduce poverty, governments should be encouraged to increase spending on health
care, education, access to water, and other essential services, not pressured
to sell them off to foreign corporations for private profit.
Trade can be a medium of development. Unfortunately, the WTO framework subordinates
development to corporate-driven free trade and marginalizes developing
countries even further. It is time to cease entertaining illusions about the
alleged beneficial effects on development of the Doha Round. The collapse of
the Doha Round will be good for the poor. With today's unraveling of the WTO
talks, the task should now be to shift to creating alternative frameworks and
institutions other than the WTO and other neoliberal trade mechanisms that
would make trade truly beneficial for the poor.
* Walden Bello is executive director of Focus on the Global South and professor
of sociology at the University of the Philippines.
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