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By Walden Bello*
When it first became part of the English vocabulary in the early 1990s, globalisation was supposed to be the wave of the future. Fifteen years ago, the writings of globalist thinkers such as Kenichi Ohmae and Robert Reich celebrated the advent of the emergence of the so-called borderless world. The process by which relatively autonomous national economies become functionally integrated into one global economy was touted as "irreversible."
And the people who opposed globalisation were disdainfully dismissed as modern day incarnations of the Luddites that destroyed machines during the Industrial Revolution.
Fifteen years later, despite global consumer brands and outsourcing, what passes for an international economy remains a collection of national economies. These economies are interdependent no doubt, but domestic factors still largely determine their dynamics.
Globalisation, in fact, has reached its high water mark and is receding.
BRIGHT PREDICTIONS, DISMAL OUTCOMES
During globalisation's heyday, we were told that state policies no
longer mattered and that corporations would soon dwarf states. In fact,
states still do matter. The European Union, the US Government, and the
Chinese state are stronger economic actors today than they were a
decade ago. In China, for instance, transnational corporations (TNCs)
march to the tune of the state rather than the other way around.
Moreover, state policies that interfere with the market in order to
build up industrial structures or protect employment still make a
difference. Indeed, over the last ten years, interventionist government
policies have spelled the difference between development and
underdevelopment, prosperity and poverty. Malaysia´s imposition of
capital controls during the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 prevented
it from unraveling like Thailand or Indonesia. Strict capital controls
also insulated China from the economic collapse engulfing its neighbors.
Fifteen years ago, we were told to expect the emergence of a
transnational capitalist elite that would manage the world economy.
Indeed, globalisation became the "grand strategy" of the Clinton
administration, which envisioned the US elite being the primus inter
pares -- first among equals -- of a global coalition leading the way to
the new, benign world order.
Today, this project lies in shambles. During the reign of George W.
Bush, the nationalist faction has overwhelmed the transnational faction
of the economic elite. Nationalism-inflected states are now competing
sharply with one another, seeking to beggar one another´s economies.
A decade ago, the World Trade Organization (WTO) was born, joining the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the pillars of
the system of international economic governance in the era of
globalisation With a triumphalist air, officials of the three
organizations meeting in Singapore during the first ministerial
gathering of the WTO in December 1996 saw the remaining task of "global
governance" as the achievement of "coherence" -- that is, the
coordination of the neoliberal policies of the three institutions in
order to ensure the smooth, technocratic integration of the global
economy.
But now Sebastian Mallaby, the influential pro-globalisation
commentator of the Washington Post, complains that "trade
liberalization has stalled, aid is less coherent than it should be, and
the next financial conflagration will be managed by an injured
fireman." In fact, the situation is worse than he describes. The IMF is
practically defunct. Knowing how the Fund precipitated and worsened the
Asian financial crisis, more and more of the advanced developing
countries are refusing to borrow from it or are paying ahead of
schedule, with some declaring their intention never to borrow again.
These include Thailand, Indonesia, Brazil, and Argentina. Since the
Fund´s budget greatly depends on debt repayments from these big
borrowers, this boycott is translating into what one expert describes
as "a huge squeeze on the budget of the organization."
The World Bank may seem to be in better health than the Fund. But
having been central to the debacle of structural adjustment policies
that left most developing and transitional economies that implemented
them in greater poverty, with greater inequality, and in a state of
stagnation, the Bank is also suffering a crisis of legitimacy. This
can only be worsened by the recent finding of an official high-level
expert panel headed by former IMF chief economist Kenneth Rogoff that
the Bank has been systematically manipulating its data to advance its
pro-globalisation position and conceal globalisation's adverse effects.
But the crisis of multilateralism is perhaps most acute at the WTO.
Last July, the Doha Round of global negotiations for more trade
liberalization unraveled abruptly when talks among the so-called Group
of Six broke down in acrimony over the US' refusal to budge on its
enormous subsidies for agriculture. The pro-free trade American
economist Fred Bergsten once compared trade liberalization and the WTO
to a bicycle: they collapse when they are not moving forward. The
collapse of an organization that one of its director generals once
described as the "jewel in the crown of multilateralism" may be nearer
than it seems.
WHY GLOBALISATION STALLED
Why did globalisation run aground? First of all, the case for
globalisation was oversold. The bulk of the production and sales of
most TNCs continues to take place within the country or region of
origin. There are only a handful of truly global corporations whose
production and sales are dispersed relatively equally across regions.
Second, rather than forge a common, cooperative response to the global
crises of overproduction, stagnation, and environmental ruin, national
capitalist elites have competed with each other to shift the burden of
adjustment. The Bush administration, for instance, has pushed a
weak-dollar policy to promote US economic recovery and growth at the
expense of Europe and Japan. It has also refused to sign the Kyoto
Protocol in order to push Europe and Japan to absorb most of the costs
of global environmental adjustment and thus make US industry
comparatively more competitive. While cooperation may be the rational
strategic choice from the point of view of the global capitalist
system, national capitalist interests are mainly concerned with not
losing out to their rivals in the short term.
A third factor has been the corrosive effect of the double standards
brazenly displayed by the hegemonic power, the United States. While the
Clinton administration did try to move the United States toward free
trade, the Bush administration has hypocritically preached free trade
while practicing protectionism. Indeed, the trade policy of the Bush
administration seems to be free trade for the rest of the world and
protectionism for the United States.
Fourth, there has been too much dissonance between the promise of
globalisation and free trade and the actual results of neoliberal
policies, which have been more poverty, inequality, and stagnation. One
of the very few places where poverty diminished over the last 15 years
is China. But interventionist state policies that managed market
forces, not neoliberal prescriptions, were responsible for lifting 120
million Chinese out of poverty. Moreover, the advocates of eliminating
capital controls have had to face the actual collapse of the economies
that took this policy to heart. The globalisation of finance proceeded
much faster than the globalisation of production. But it proved to be
the cutting edge not of prosperity but of chaos. The Asian financial
crisis and the collapse of the economy of Argentina, which had been
among the most doctrinaire practitioners of capital account
liberalization, were two decisive moments in reality´s revolt against
theory.
Another factor unraveling the globalist project derives from its
obsession with economic growth. Indeed, unending growth is the
centerpiece of globalisation, the mainspring of its legitimacy. While
a recent World Bank report continues -- amazingly -- to extol rapid
growth as the key to expanding the global middle class, global warming,
peak oil, and other environmental events are making it clear to people
that the rates and patterns of growth that come with globalisation are
a surefire prescription for an ecological Armageddon.
The final factor, not to be underestimated, has been popular resistance
to globalisation The battles of Seattle in 1999, Prague in 2000, and
Genoa in 2001; the massive global anti-war march on 15 February, 2003,
when the anti-globalisation movement morphed into the global anti-war
movement; the collapse of the WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun in 2003
and its near collapse in Hong Kong in 2005; the French and Dutch
peoples´ rejection of the neoliberal, pro-globalisation European
Constitution in 2005 -- these were all critical junctures in a
decade-long global struggle that has rolled back the neoliberal
project. But these high-profile events were merely the tip of the
iceberg, the summation of thousands of anti-neoliberal,
anti-globalisation struggles in thousands of communities throughout the
world involving millions of peasants, workers, students, indigenous
people, and many sectors of the middle class.
DOWN BUT NOT OUT
While corporate-driven globalisation may be down, it is not out. Though
discredited, many pro-globalisation neoliberal policies remain in place
in many economies, for lack of credible alternative policies in the
eyes of technocrats. With things not moving at the WTO, the big
trading powers are emphasizing free trade agreements (FTAs) and
economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with developing countries.
These agreements are in many ways more dangerous than the multilateral
negotiations at the WTO since they often require greater concessions in
terms of market access and tighter enforcement of intellectual property
rights.
However, things are no longer that easy for the big corporations and
trading powers. Doctrinaire neo-liberals are being eased out of key
positions, giving way to pragmatic technocrats that often subvert
neoliberal policies in practice owing to popular pressure. When it
comes to FTAs, the global south is becoming aware of the dangers and is
beginning to resist. Key South American governments under pressure from
their citizens derailed the Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA) -- the
grand plan of George W. Bush for the Western hemisphere -- during the
Mar del Plata conference in November 2005.
Also, one of the reasons many people resisted Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra in the months before the recent coup in Thailand was his
rush to conclude a free trade agreement with the United States. Indeed,
in January this year, some 10,000 protesters tried to storm the
building in
Chiang Mai, Thailand, where US and Thai officials were negotiating. The
government that succeeded Thaksin´s has put the US - Thai FTA on hold,
and movements seeking to stop FTAs elsewhere have been inspired by the
success of the Thai efforts.
The retreat from neoliberal globalisation is most marked in Latin
America. Long exploited by foreign energy giants, Bolivia under
President Evo Morales has nationalized its energy resources. Nestor
Kirchner of Argentina gave an example of how developing country
governments can face down finance capital when he forced northern
bondholders to accept only 25 cents of every dollar Argentina owed
them. Hugo Chavez has launched an ambitious plan for regional
integration, the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), based
on genuine economic cooperation instead of free trade, with little or
no participation by northern TNCs, and driven by what Chavez himself
describes as a "logic beyond capitalism." (see "ALBA Venezuela´s answer
to "free trade": the Bolivarian alternative for the Americas" by Diego
Azzi and David Harris,
http://www.focusweb.org/alba-venezuela-s-answer-to-free-trade-the-bolivarian-alternative-for-the-ame.html)
GLOBALISATION IN PERSPECTIVE
From today´s vantage point, globalisation appears to have been not a
new, higher phase in the development of capitalism but a response to
the underlying structural crisis of this system of production. Fifteen
years since it was trumpeted as the wave of the future, globalisation
seems to have been less a "brave new phase" of the capitalist adventure
than a desperate effort by global capital to escape the stagnation and
disequilibria overtaking the global economy in the 1970s and 1980s. The
collapse of the centralized socialist regimes in Central and Eastern
Europe deflected people´s attention from this reality in the early
1990s.
Many in progressive circles still think that the task at hand is to
"humanize" globalisation globalisation, however, is a spent force.
Today´s multiplying economic and political conflicts resemble, if
anything, the period following the end of what historians refer to as
the first era of globalisation, which extended from 1815 to the
eruption of World War I in 1914. The urgent task is not to steer
corporate-driven globalisation in a "social democratic" direction but
to manage its retreat so that it does not bring about the same chaos
and conflicts that marked its demise in that earlier era.
* Walden Bello is professor of sociology at the University of the
Philippines and executive director of the Bangkok-based research and
advocacy institute Focus on the Global South. An extended version of
this piece titled "The Capitalist Conjuncture: Overaccumulation,
Financial Crises, and the Retreat from globalisation," appears in the
latest number of Third World Quarterly (Vol. 27, No. 8, 2006).
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