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By Praful Bidwai
NEW DELHI, Jul 23 (IPS) - After tortuous negotiations spread over four days in Washington, the United States and India have reported "substantial progress" on a bilateral agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, but said they would now "refer the issue to our governments for final review."
However, the deal, also known as the '123 agreement' because it will amend Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, is unlikely to find broad consensual acceptance either in India or the U.S.
So wary are the two governments about announcing a breakthrough that they have given no details of the agreement's contents, and in particular about its acceptance of India's right to reprocess fuel burned in imported reactors and continuity of fuel supplies from the U.S. in case India conducts a nuclear test.
The agreement is soon to be placed before India's Cabinet Committee on
Security. It is due to be put up before the U.S. Congress for an
'up-and-down' or yes-or-no vote without amendments. Under Indian law,
it need not be ratified by Parliament.
The deal became possible only with intervention by U.S. Vice-President
Dick Cheney and talks between the National Security Advisers of the two
countries, as well as high-powered delegations of diplomats and
technical experts.
Looming large over the talks was the presence of India's Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) chairman Anil Kakodkar. Although Kakodkar did not
participate in the negotiations, he was continually consulted to ensure
that his concerns about the deal are met. Kakodkar is known to be less
than happy with the deal, and has orchestrated opposition to it through
his former colleagues.
According to media reports, the 30 page-long agreement, reached after
300 working hours of talks, only 'partly' concedes India's right to
reprocess spent fuel to be used in its fast breeder reactor programme.
India has all along insisted on such a full-fledged 'right' -- strongly
contested by non-proliferation advocates in the U.S.
Indian negotiators are believed to have offered to build a dedicated
reprocessing facility for imported fuel and to place it under
safeguards (inspections) of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA).
This proposal is proving controversial in India, but the U.S seems to
have accepted it. It is not known if this carries any conditions.
On the second contentious issue, that of guarantees of U.S. nuclear
supplies if India conducts a nuclear explosion, it has been agreed that
the U.S. can demand a return of equipment and material exported to
India.
But this has reportedly been hedged in with clauses that call for a
Presidential review of the circumstances in which India conducts a
test, as well as technical conditions calculated to prevent a sudden
and complete suspension of nuclear cooperation.
Both the U.S. Atomic Energy Act and a special legislation passed last
December by the U.S. Congress, called the Henry J. Hyde U.S.-India
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act 2006, mandate a cessation of
nuclear cooperation in case India conducts a test. Under the new
agreement, such cessation will not be sudden.
"The Indian side obviously did some tough bargaining," says Achin
Vanaik, a political scientist and independent nuclear analyst. "The
critical question now is how the two main lobbies opposed to the deal
react. There is, first, the nuclear scientists' lobby which is allergic
to any external inspections. There is also the hawkish political right,
led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which wrongly holds that the
deal will cap India's nuclear weapons capability."
Some nuclear scientists, such as A.N. Prasad, former director of the
Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, and A. Gopalakrishnan, former chairman
of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, have attacked the proposal to
create a dedicated reprocessing facility on the ground that its
operations will be controlled by foreign agencies and that it will
raise the processing costs. Yet others, including two former AEC
chairmen, have demanded amendments to the Hyde Act.
However, the U.S. insists that the 123 agreement cannot substantially differ from the Hyde Act.
"It is not clear if the nuclear scientists' lobby can be brought around
to supporting the agreement in its present form," argues M.V. Ramana, a
researcher with the Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Environment
and Development, Bangalore. "If a majority of its constituents remain
hostile to the agreement, political opposition to it will grow."
Adds Ramana: "Many of the arguments of this lobby are self-serving and
reflect xenophobia and a reluctance to accept any kind of scrutiny,
including IAEA inspections. However, there is some validity in the
argument that a dedicated reprocessing facility will raise costs. But
that is something India can live with. The trouble is that this lobby
wants to have its cake and eat it too: it wants India to be treated on
a par with the nuclear weapons-states recognised by the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, although India is not a party to it."
BJP leaders have already declared that they oppose the Hyde Act and the
123 agreement in its present form. Observers close to India's Left
parties believe that they are unlikely to support the agreement, and
will want to hold down Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to various
commitments he made in Parliament. As for the U.S., non-proliferation
experts and political leaders, especially from the Democratic Party,
oppose any deal that exempts India from U.S. laws and effectively
legitimises its nuclear arsenal while diluting the global norm against
the spread of nuclear weapons.
Says Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control
Association, if the U.S. agrees to allow India to reprocess imported
spent fuel, "it would still be next to impossible to ensure that U.S.
technology and material would not be used directly or indirectly to
support or facilitate India's unsafeguarded weapons-related plutonium
reprocessing activities ...(A reprocessing facility) would further free
up India's limited fuel supplies for weapons purposes."
Kimball argues that this would be the fourth major departure from the
U.S. laws and policies. The first happened in July 2005 when the Bush
administration agreed to drop its longstanding policy of restricting
nuclear cooperation with states that have nuclear weapons, or have
tested them, and refuse to allow full-scope IAEA safeguards.
The second departure took place when the Bush administration gave up
its demand that India suspend production of fissile material for
weapons purposes. The third happened in March 2006 when the U.S. urged
India to include in its list of 'civil' nuclear facilities slated to be
put under safeguards reactors falling in its fast breeder programme;
"but again, India refused and the U.S. side went along".
Unless the 123 agreement is rejected by the Indian cabinet, or fails to
win Congressional ratification, which seems highly unlikely, the arms
controllers would have to take their battle to other fora which must
approve the deal before it gets come into effect: the 45-member Nuclear
Suppliers' Group and the IAEA.
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