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FOCUS Researcher Wins Prix Du Jeune Auteur
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Our very own Aya Fabros received the PRIX DU JEUNE AUTEUR for her study on call center work. The Prix du Jeune Auteur is an annual award given by the French sociological journal, Sociologie du Travail, one of the leading academic journals on sociology of work, established by noted sociologists such as Alain Touraine and Jean-Daniel Reynaud. An article based on Aya’s thesis will be published in the journal’s next issue, while the full study will be tackled in her forthcoming book, Outsourced Selves.
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Editor’s Notes PDF Print E-mail
by Aya Fabros

Last month, FOP took a first stab at the MOA-AD and the Mindanao question. Since then, the MOA-AD has been scrapped and the negotiations descended into an indefinite impasse spiked with armed hostilities escalating in Muslim Mindanao. In this issue, we put together a virtual forum to keep the discussions going. Reflections from Sol Santos, Rufa Cagoco-Guiao, Nathan Quimpo, Octa Dinampo, Mon Casiple, and Herbert Docena offer handles for all of us who are trying to make sense of this recent MOA episode and the larger dilemmas that remain unresolved.

The MOA itself is seen by most as a crucial step that puts forward important concepts such as “shared sovereignty” and “associative relationships”, demonstrating that a “compromise” is possible and a middle ground that addresses historic injustice and larger nation-building issues can be forged. Several authors stressed the importance of reviving the MOA in future discussions, in order to resuscitate a moribund process, pointing to the dangers of a deadlock that would push parties to engage in war rather than continue discussion on peace and justice. However, given the fierce reaction to the document, hinging future talks on the MOA is also deemed difficult and ‘unrealistic’. This also underscores the critical role of the state in disseminating information and rallying public support, a key parallel process that was absent in this and previous rounds of negotiations. Such processes are vital given the strong, insidious anti-Moro prejudice and chauvinism that’s gleaned from the violent response to the peace talks and the MOA.
 
These are just some of the key points presented in the articles below; all of which reiterate: The MOA-AD may be dead, but it points to a lot of issues that need to be discussed, lessons to take stock of, debates to pursue as we explore ways forward.


What happened?

The analyses provide a postmortem. Apart from pointing out 'flaws', the articles also underscore political dimensions behind the death of the MOA. Casiple points out 'defects' in both the MOA and the peace negotiations, which just went against political and economic realities as seen in the fierce opposition. Although there’s no consensus on the actual points of protest, for the authors, what killed the MOA is the widespread uproar, which came from ‘the whole Philippine side-- Executive, Legislative, Judiciary, Local Governments, Business Sector, Media, General Public, etc’.

Santos puts it this way, "The MOA has become politically untenable to sign as far as the government's own constituency is concerned. The non-signing of the MOA was calculated to give the Executive some space to engage in various political efforts to defuse the political situation as well as address the ground situation."

Guiam pins much of the blame on a lack of information and public education, which she considers extremely crucial in a country as diverse and divided as the Philippines. For her, the uproar made it clear that "the Philippines, its state mechanisms and processes are still under the control of a vast majority that likes to imagine the country as one solid and integrated "Filipino" nation. Such a nation is built on a core of basically Christian Filipino values that largely negates identities that contravene these core values. When the GRP announced a MOA granting "extraordinary" rights to a group that does not hold the same core values, the majority group reacted negatively, even violently."

In this respect, the MOA-AD can also be considered a casualty of prejudice and chauvinism of a Filipino majority conditioned to regard Moros with suspicion and contempt. The secrecy and haste, along with Arroyo’s lack of legitimacy made matters worse. For Quimpo, "How could a government that had become widely perceived as being the most corrupt, most repressive, and most unpopular since the Marcos regime possibly rally public support for any peace deal that it could forge with the MILF?"

Quimpo traces everything back to Hello Garci and the deep links between Muslim Mindanao and national trapo politics. Arroyo benefits from disorder, lawlessness and corruption in Mindanao, "Why change all that?," says Quimpo, implying that there was no serious interest in delivering a peace agreement. He also cautions that the same trapo system could seriously undermine future self-determination arrangements like the ARMM and the BJE.

Where are we now?
Santos reiterates: the MOA is dead. Rather than dwell on concerns on national sovereignty and the constitution, the question now is "whether the peace process with the MILF is also dead or at a dead end, where the detour taken could lead to full-blown war."

Docena also notes "the prospect for peace has never been bleaker since the 1970s."

While official pronouncements maintain that both camps are still open to talks, the government insists on DDR, as the MILF hints it'll just wait for the next president. Docena reads between the DDR lines and says, "the government for its part now says that the talks will resume only if the Moros disarm. In other words, surrender. For the government, it is force, yet again, that will keep the Moros within the Philippines. The door to negotiations slammed on their faces, Moros are faced with no other option but to resist."

Santos contextualizes the MILF's stance as a rejection of further negotiations with the Arroyo administration: "They [MILF] take what happened to the MOA (including but not just the Executive's decision of non-signing) as the GRP having negotiated in bad faith, and thus the basic trust built by years of peace talks has been seriously eroded. The bottom line is that the Arroyo administration cannot deliver at all," according to Santos.
 
Still, the MOA episode also offers a glimpse of some gains. Guian considers the MOA-AD itself as a positive gain, regarding it as a "powerful document that can move the peace process forward."

Docena shares this: "the MOA-AD is a step forward from the Moros' current subordination and marginalization within a country that they did not choose to be a part of."
 
"Though the MOA-AD falls far short of the Moros' original goal of establishing an independent state, it goes farther-- and is more specific-- than any of the previous agreements in providing for greater Moro self-rule," he adds.

For Santos, the MOA-AD has provided a unifying platform for Moros, an entry point to national public discourse and offered proof that a compromise is possible. "The MOA shows that at least some Filipinos and Moros can compromise or find a middle ground for a proposed BJE which would be something between the existing ARMM and independent statehood, the original common aspiration of the Moro liberation fronts," says Santos.
 
Casiple however warns against hinging future talks on the MOA given the opposition, the imbalance and the weak consideration of present realities. For him, "any just and lasting peace agreement should lead to a situation of future peaceful co-existence of all inhabitants in disputed territories."

Where do we go from here?
The articles underscore important lessons and suggest next steps. It cannot be overemphasized—such a crucial and sensitive process requires careful handling, serious work, and complementary efforts in different fronts.

Stressing the importance of learning from past experience, Guiam explains that "in any peace process, the state that engages a rebel group in negotiations and dialogues is expected to set in motion a parallel process of information dissemination and public education about why such a process has to take place...for the state to secure the 'consent' from its majority constituents on a deal with a group that is perceived by the majority as the cause of all 'trouble'."

Quimpo also underlines the need to hold government accountable for its (mis)conduct and actions as well as the consequences of its trapo ploys and practices. "Arroyo should have known that peace negotiations are serious business and not her usual game of patronage. If the Arroyo government did not conduct proper consultations with all sectors concerned, it should take responsibility. If there are provisions in the MOA that are indeed unconstitutional, it should take responsibility. It cannot simply wash its hands and walk away."

What should be done from here on? Santos proposes the following steps for the Arroyo administration: "maintain ceasefire, enhance rehabilitation and development work, pursue consultation and dialogue, information and education, building of a constituency supportive of the general goals and specific objectives as well as the processes and contents of peace negotiations."

Veering away from loaded discussions that associate the MOA with words like unconstitutional, dismemberment of the republic, and treason, Docena, Santos, and Guiam situate the MOA-AD in the context of a long history of coercion, subjugation and marginalization. For them, the goal of the peace process is to correct this historical injustice by achieving a just middle ground between the Moros and the Philippine state. They think the MOA presents key proposals and principles that ought to be maintained to revive the peace process.

"For those committed to peace with justice, our duty does not end in merely preventing the outbreak of full-blown fighting or calling for a ceasefire, if such a ceasefire ends up perpetuating a status quo in which the Moros continue to be held at gunpoint within the Philippines. It merely begins with advocating for a long-term solution that addresses and ends the historical oppression suffered by Moros. No solution will lead to peace if it is not just; and it won't be just if it does not advance the Moros' right to self-determination. While advancing this right is not all that is required, no solution will be complete without it," Docena reminds us.

These are just some of the valuable points to ponder, as we strive to preserve the space for substantial and sustained talks for peace and justice in Muslim Mindanao. Please read on, ruminate and respond.

 
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