By Walden Bello
(Composite article based on the author's two presentations at the meeting of the "Our World is not for Sale Coalition," Brussels, Belgium, Dec. 7-9, 2001.)
How should we characterize the outcome of the World Trade Organization ministerial in Doha? I am not sure if a debate on whether or not a new round of trade negotiations was launched in Doha will lead us very far. But something very threatening occurred in Doha, and that is what we must urgently convey to the world, which at the moment is very confused as to what its outcomes really were.
Three Key Outcomes
Three outcomes of Doha must be emphasized:
- Doha put the World Trade Organization (WTO) back on its feet after the disaster in Seattle. C. Fred Bergsten, a prominent partisan of the WTO, once said that the WTO is like a bicycle: it collapses if it does not move forward. By agreeing on a declaration giving momentum to new negotiations for liberalization, the Doha meeting got the bicycle upright and moving again. Mike Moore, the director general, was not exaggerating when he thanked the ministerial for "saving the WTO."
- What resulted from Doha may not be a new round in the sense of immediate negotiations on a wide range of issues, but it was a major step toward further liberalization. First of all, the Doha declaration affirmed ongoing negotiations on certain existing agreements, such as agriculture and GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) and opened negotiations to review other existing agreements, like the anti-dumping agreement. Second, it launched negotiations for new agreements, for instance, on industrial tariffs. Third, and perhaps most ominous, by putting them as the centerpiece of the declaration, Doha gave momentum to the eventual launching of negotiations to bring new, non-trade areas within WTO jurisdiction. These are the so-called "new" or "Singapore issues" of investment, competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation.
- Doha was a clear setback for the developing countries, most of whom had wanted to focus the ministerial and its aftermath on resolving outstanding issues of implementation from the Uruguay Round, of which there are at least 104 according to the Group of 77. The declaration simply acknowledged these concerns and outlined a vague process for their resolution. Indeed, even in key areas of implementation specified in the text, such as agriculture and textiles and garments, the developing countries came out as losers. The European Union managed to water down the Cairns Group's demand that there be a quick phase-out of agricultural export subsidies, and the US and other developed countries did not commit to an early removal of quotas on textile and garment imports of critical importance to the developing countries.
It is important to stress that the South lost out in Doha because much of the influential Northern press has been saying that Doha proves that the developing countries can win in WTO negotiations. The Doha resolution of the TRIPs (Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights) and public health issue is often cited to prove this. Now it is certainly true that this was a step forward for the developing countries. However, it is important not to exaggerate its significance. The statement that "Nothing in the TRIPs Agreement shall prevent Members from measures to protect public health" is a political statement. There is nothing in the Doha compromise that commits members to change the text of TRIPs--which was, in effect, a victory for the US position. Even the Economist, an untiring promoter of the idea that the WTO is good for the developing countries, has had to admit that "the declaration is political and not legally binding." This is important since in the long run it is the legal text that counts, and it will be the basis on which the pharmaceuticals may sue developing countries when they deem the political climate more favorable.
Qualifying Defeat
Doha was a defeat for the developing world. It is nevertheless important to realize that the developing countries went to Doha much better prepared than they were for previous ministerials, partly owing to the "capacity-building" work of civil society groups based in Geneva. The united front of a big block of developing countries against the new issues did hold until the end, when it crumbled under the onslaught of terrific pressure from the Quad and other developed countries. True, in the end, India stood alone in active opposition, with the tacit backing-it must be noted--of a couple of other countries such as Cuba, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic. Nonetheless, the consciousness of common interests and the need of having a common strategy vis-?-vis the dominant trading powers is something that is greater now and it provides a good basis for common action in the hard months ahead.
Context and Tactics
Doha took place amidst conditions that were already unfavorable from the point of view of developing country interests. The September 11 events provided a heaven-sent opportunity for US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick and European Union Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy to step up the pressure on the developing countries to agree to the launching of a new trade round, invoking the rationale that it was necessary to counter a global downturn that had been worsened by the terrorist actions. The location was also unfavorable, Qatar being a monarchy where dissent could be easily controlled. The WTO Secretariat's authority over who would be granted visas to enter Qatar for the ministerial allowed it to radically limit the number of legitimate NGO's that could be present, thus preventing that explosive interaction of developing country resentment and massive street protest that took place in Seattle.
Still, these factors would not have been sufficient to bring about an unfavorable outcome. Tactics mattered, and here the developing countries were clearly outmaneuvered in Doha. The methods employed by the European Union and the United States to split the South must be denounced and, as many participants in the Brussels meeting have strongly urged, carefully documented. More important, they must be studied closely to better prepare the developing countries next time. Among these tactics the Brussels review highlighted the following:
- Pushing a highly unbalanced draft declaration and presenting it to the ministerial as a "clean text" on which there allegedly was consensus, thus restricting the arena of substantive discussion and making it difficult for developing countries to register fundamental objections without seeming "obstructionist."
- Pitting officials from the capitals against their negotiators based in Geneva, with the latter being characterized as "recalcitrant" or "narrow."
- Employing direct threats, as the United States did when it warned Haiti and the Dominican Republic to cease opposition to its position on government procurement or risk cancellation of their preferential trade arrangements.
- Buying off countries with goodies, as the European Union did when, in return for their agreeing to the final declaration, it assured countries in the ACP (Africa-Caribbean-Pacific) group that the WTO would respect the so-called "ACP Waiver" that would allow them to export their agricultural commodities to Europe at preferential terms relative to other developing countries. Pakistan, a stalwart among developing countries in Geneva, was notably quiet at Doha. Apparently, this had something to do with the US's granting Pakistan a massive aid package of grants, loans, and debt reduction owing to its special status in the US war against terrorism. Nigeria had taken the step of issuing an official communique denouncing the draft declaration before Doha, but came out loudly supporting it on November 14-a flip-flop that is difficult to separate from the US's coming up with the promise of a big economic and military aid package in the interim.
- Reinstituting the infamous "Green Room" on November 13 and 14, when some 20 handpicked countries were isolated from the rest and "delegated" by the WTO secretariat and the big powers to come up with the final declaration. These countries were not picked by a democratic process, and efforts by some developing country representatives to insert themselves into this select group were rebuffed, some gently, others quite explicitly, as was the case with a delegate from Uganda.
- Finally, pressuring the developing countries by telling them that they would bear the onus for causing the collapse of another ministerial, the collapse of the WTO, and the deepening of the global recession that would allegedly be the consequence of these two events.
Doha was a low point in the GATT-WTO's history of backroom intimidation, threats, bribery, and non-transparency. But take it from the horse's mouth itself: no less than the EU's Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, described the Doha process as "medieval." There are no records of the actual decision-making process in Doha because the formal sessions of the ministerial--which is where decision-making is made in a democratic system--were reserved for speeches, and the real decisions took place in informal groupings whose meeting places kept shifting and were not known to all. There being no records, there is little accountability and the principals in any deals can deny that they engaged in questionable behavior.
A Fragile Recovery
The bicycle is upright, but it is still wobbly, and one of the reasons is that there lingers great resentment among developing countries of the whole non-transparent process of bamboozling them into accepting a declaration running counter to their interests. The WTO's crisis of legitimacy is not over, and the non-transparency and lack of democracy so evident in Doha may yet deepen it.
Also adding to the resentment is the EU's Agricultural Commissioner's post-Doha declaration that the watering down of the statement on the phasing out of agricultural export subsidies was a "victory" for the EU--which many have taken to mean that the EU will fight tooth and nail to keep the subsidies in the coming agricultural negotiations.
There was also Washington's recent decision to slap tariffs of up to 40 per cent against steel imports, allegedly to counter dumping activities but really to save their already highly protected steel industry. Coming shortly after Doha, this is now seen by other countries as an indication that Washington is not serious about the renegotiation of the anti-dumping agreement it agreed to in Doha and is intent on continuing to use its anti-dumping mechanisms to prevent market access not only in steel but in textiles, garments, and agricultural commodities.
Then there is the deepening global recession, which stems to a great extent from the indiscriminate integration and interlocking of economies brought about by trade liberalization. In both North and South, there are emerging strong domestic pressures to protect and salvage industries, creating a global climate that is increasingly hostile to further trade liberalization.
These factors make the Doha outcome a fragile one, and a key part of our task is find a way of bringing them together in an effective way in the coming months to reverse the Doha dynamic.
The Chairman's Statement: A Key Point of Contention
Having pointed to these "mitigating" factors, we must emphasize that they merely mitigate what is a position of strategic disadvantage for us, from which we need to extricate ourselves. But as Martin Khor noted, NGOs fight best when they have their backs against the wall. In this regard, one of the most promising weapons is the Chairman's statement on negotiations on the new issues, which will be the main area of contention. The Chairman's statement appended to the final declaration, which was issued to end India's opposition to the document, reads:
"Let me say that with respect to the reference to an 'explicit consensus' being needed, in these paragraphs, for a decision to be taken at the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference, my understanding is that, at that session, a decision would indeed need to be taken by explicit consensus, before negotiations on trade and investment and trade and competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation could proceed.
In my view, this would also give each member the right to take a position on the modalities that would prevent negotiations from proceeding after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference until that member is prepared to join in an explicit consensus."
I agree with those who say that the future of the new issues will depend on how much weight will be attached to the Chairman's statement and whose interpretation will win out. At a meeting we had with European Commission officials right after our Brussels review, on December 10, Philippe Meyer, head of the Unit on Investments of the EC's Directorate-General for Trade, stated that he was glad that the WTO members "had agreed to launch negotiations on investment." This was, in my view intentional, and part of a strategy to obscure the fact that both the Chairman's statement and the Doha Declaration itself state that negotiations will not be launched until after the Fifth Ministerial in 2003 and only after there is an explicit consensus to launch negotiations.
Given this not-too-subtle offensive to define the process, it is important for our side to loudly insist at every possible forum that 1) negotiations cannot start until after the Fifth Ministerial; 2) that negotiations can take place only if there is an explicit consensus drawn from each and every country to undertake them; 3) that, as the Chairman's statement makes explicit, the absence of an explicit consensus to start negotiations from even one member- country will be sufficient to keep negotiations from proceeding; and 4) that the Chairman's statement carries the same legal weight as the Doha Declaration.
The Missing Link
Let me move on to some comments about civil society and Doha. Civil society was present in Doha in the form of some 60 representatives of genuine-as opposed to business and government-controlled-NGO's. Their impact was, however, greater than their numbers, with this band of hardy souls staging demonstrations and direct actions right in the convention site, in a direct challenge to both the Qatari and WTO authorities!
In comparison to Seattle, the protests this time around were really global, taking place in some 40 countries on Nov. 10-11 and mobilizing hundreds of thousands of people. This show of solidarity against corporate-driven globalization was impressive, but, unfortunately, like the protests at the Doha Sheraton, it hardly made a dent on the Doha process.
Maude Barlow has said that massing on the streets in one location might no longer work in the future since the multilaterals have learned their lessons from Seattle and are likely to hold their get-togethers in isolated, distant sites. Doha certainly proved the success of this strategy. Nevertheless, as Maude would definitely agree, we cannot give up the streets, and must, in fact, make greater efforts to assert our right to them in the coming period, as governments and police seek to restrict the rights of the anti-globalization movement under the guise of opposing terrorists.
Despite the outcome of Doha, one cannot emphasize too strongly the impact of the patient efforts of many groups in our coalition to assist developing country delegations in Geneva to gain a better technical and political understanding of WTO issues and processes. Among the fruits of this cooperation was the proposal to attach a "Development Box" to the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), which would exempt countries from undertaking liberalization measures mandated by the WTO in order to achieve food security and development objectives.
But the collapse of most of the developing countries at Doha owing to intense pressure from the Quad and other developed countries showed up the limitations of the street protest-cum-Geneva lobby approach. As Fernando Alegria, Mariama Williams, and other participants in the Brussels meeting regularly pointed out, there is a missing element and that is the consistent pressure from social movements on their governments. There is simply no alternative to movements on the ground, in country after country, putting their governments' feet to the fire. Unless this vacuum is filled, the next ministerial will be a repeat of Doha.
Our work is really cut out for us, and we have only 15 to 18 months before the Fifth Ministerial to get our act together: formulating and setting into motion a strategy that innovatively brings together the protests in the streets, intense delegation-by-delegation lobbying in Geneva, and massive grassroots pressures on governments at home.
Summary
In summary, the main lessons from the Doha debacle are, in my view:
- Doha set the bicycle of WTO-directed global trade liberalization upright and back into motion.
- Doha was a defeat for developing countries, though they went into the ministerial with a greater consciousness of common interests and greater degree of unity than in the past.
- The September 11 context and the site of the ministerial mattered, but it was the dirty high-pressure tactics of the US and the EU in a non-transparent and non-democratic process that was principally responsible for the outcome.
- The developed countries' victory at Doha is, however, a fragile one that may be unravelled by the combination of continuing developing country resentments at the non-transparent process, refusal of the EU and the US to live up to their commitments in the declaration, and growing resistance to further liberalization in both North and South triggered by the accelerating and deepening global recession.
- The main front of battle in the coming months will be the new issues, and the weight given to Chairman's statement appended to the declaration and its interpretation will be a key factor determining the outcome.
- Civil society intervention will continue to be an extremely critical factor,
and the outcome of the next ministerial and the whole struggle against indiscriminate
liberalization will depend on the emergence of what is now the missing link:
social movements that mobilize to prevent their national governments from making
destructive concessions. What can make the difference is an innovative strategy
that combines street protests, the Geneva lobbying, and grassroots pressures
on home governments in a coordinated fashion.