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People speak and write today about feelings of utter powerlessness to
prevent the coming war. So powerful is the US. And so determined to strike.
Impotence in the face of the supremely powerful. With our imagination
limited by memories of the superpower standoffs and ambiguous victories
and defeats of the Cold War period, it is tempting to see the current
situation as unique.
Yet the world has been here before. In the summer of 1940, after the fall
of France, when Nazi Germany’s determined drive to global dominance
seemed unstoppable by any possible combination of forces. In the Europe
of the early 1800’s, when a seemingly invincible Napoleon put to
rout in battle after battle any military alliance its many foes could
muster.
The last few years and the coming ones have been and will be bad for world
peace. They are, however, rich in lessons about international power relations.
And the lessons are not all grim.
Hegemony and Insecurity
To be sure, the first lesson is discouraging: that unchallenged superpower
status stimulates conflict, not peace. This did not seem so clear in the
immediate aftermath of the Cold War. Then, there was widespread in the
West an expectation that the US would use its sole superpower status to
undergird a multilateral order that would institutionalize its hegemony
but assure an Augustan peace globally. Even some people not enamored of
the United States speculated that with superpower rivalry gone and all
other potential rivals taking themselves out of the competition, Washington’s
quest for military superiority and strategic advantage would slow down.
Europe, Japan, and China seemed ready to settle down to a condition of
controlled competition in the economic sphere while accepting long-term
American dominance in the security area.
In fact, as the nineties rolled on, it became clear that what the end
of the Cold War ushered in was a volatile period more dangerous than the
Cold War, when the superpower standoff warded off big wars, contained
smaller wars, and gave relations among states a certain predictability.
The instability of the new era did not stem primarily from the emergence
of “irrational” non-state actors that were prepared to engage
in “asymmetric warfare” against conventionally powerful state
actors, though many Beltway intellectuals made their names painting terrorists
as the greatest threats to global peace and stability in the post-Cold
War era. It came from the transformation of the balance of power in the
global state system.
The Balance of Power
The balance of power among states is the subject of John Mearsheimer’s
magnum opus The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Regarded as the definitive
work on the subject, the book argues persuasively that in all balance
of power systems, great powers aim not so much to achieve a defensive
balance against their rivals as to achieve a significant degree of military
and political advantage over them. Mearsheimer is also correct that “bipolar”
systems such as the US-Soviet faceoff that dictated the dynamics of the
Cold War period are more stable and less likely to break down than “multipolar”
systems like the pre-Word War II situation, which was marked by relative
equality among a number of powerful states.
What Mearsheimer fails to tell us, however, is that the situation most
productive of conflict, tension, and instability is one where there is
one overwhelmingly dominant power surrounded by a number of midget powers--meaning
today’s world. He quotes with approval Kant’s comment that
“It is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to arrive at
a condition of perpetual peace by conquering the whole world, if that
were possible.” Yet he does not seem to appreciate the fact that
Kant’s insight is perhaps of greatest relevance in the post-Cold
War world, where American military and political preponderance is unmatched.
This intellectual failure is jarring, and it stems from a primordial belief
that Washington, unlike other great powers, is not just motivated by naked
realpolitik but by the desire for a benign global order as well. These
ideological blinders prevent Mearsheimer and many other American intellectuals
from appreciating the fact that the US has switched its role from that
of being an “offshore balancer” against would-be hegemons
like Hitler and the former Soviet Union to being itself an aggressive
power bent on achieving world hegemony.
The Unilateralist Conjuncture
Many critics of US power, for their part, attribute George W. Bush’s
unilateralism to the self-centered, provincial worldview of the American
right. This explanation confuses cause and effect. Bush’s unilateralist
ideology is a product of a unique structural conjuncture: the consolidation
of the civilian-military “defense establishment” that won
the Cold War as the dominant faction of the US elite and the disappearance
of an effective countervailing force to US power in the global state system.
To mask its shift from containment to hegemony, however, the defense establishment
needed a rationale, and the last decade saw its invoking a succession
of actors to fill the role vacated by the Soviet Union—North Korea,
China, Al Qaeda, the “Axis of Evil.” Paying very little respect
to the actual state and capacity of the targeted regimes, this process
was embarrassingly opportunistic and failed to achieve credibility even
among a critical mass of its prime target group, the American people.
From this perspective, the September 11 attack was a godsend that consolidated
domestic support for the open-ended and preemptive unilateralist interventionism
that was articulated in George W. Bush’s historic speech on Sept.
17, 2002.
As for the multilateralist paradigm, this was never a serious alternative
entertained by any significant faction of the US elite except perhaps
for marginalized old liberal circles and personalities like Jimmy Carter.
Bill Clinton, who distrusted fellow Democrat Jimmy Carter, may have invoked
multilateralist rhetoric but he did not hesitate to act unilaterally--as
he did when he ordered the bombing of Serbia despite European objections
during the Kosovo crisis.
Containing Washington
That is the bad news. The good news is that even when backed up by overwhelming
force, unchallenged hegemony is a transient state. As was the case in
Napoleonic Europe, lesser powers may calculate that a posture of compliance
or subservience may be necessary in the short-term, but they know that
it is disastrous as a long-term strategy, for it is simply an invitation
to more aggression.
This is what the UN Security Council standoff over Iraq is all about.
It is less about Saddam’s compliance and more about containing a
hegemon that feels it has a blank cheque to intervene, topple, and depose
anywhere in the world with the dangerous rationale of preventing a threat,
no matter how abstract, from “reaching the American people.”
If France and Germany at this point seem willing to go the distance in
stubbornly blocking the US from waging war on Iraq, it is to discourage
future US moves that might pose a more direct threat to their national
security. Cultural bonds or a sense of generosity for being liberated
from Nazism 50 years ago are weak rationales when compared to the fear
of encouraging aggressive ambitions that could translate into economic
bullying in the short term and military blackmail in the long term.
However the current Iraq crisis is resolved—and indeed France and
Germany may yet capitulate under pressure—it has already accelerated
the decline of the Atlantic Alliance of the Cold War era, a development
captured in US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s disdainful
comments about recalcitrant “Old Europe.” And it marks the
rebirth of balance of power politics, with the lesser powers moved into
active cooperation to contain US aggression. Joining France and Germany
in what is emerging as this era’s version of the pre-World War I
Triple Alliance are China and Russia, with the more weighty developing
countries like Brazil and perhaps even South Korea eventually hopping
on board. Though individual members may change, this coalition is likely
to be long-term. And, unlike currently, where its real dynamics are clouded
by the debate over the question of Saddam’s alleged possession of
weapons of mass destruction, its basis will eventually be more clearly
articulated as the defense of national and global security against the
American threat.
Global Resistance
This reemergence of a system of containment at the level of the state
system must be seen in the context of the advance of other movements of
global resistance. There are, of course, the Islamic fundamentalists,
who have made tremendous gains among the Arab and Muslim masses owing
to the US mailed-fist response to September 11 events and its alliance
with Israel. The coming war on Iraq is likely to drastically weaken the
so-called moderate regimes in the Arab and Muslim world and eventually
give rise to governments uncompromising in their resistance to US interventionism.
Not too long from now, we may see radical Islamic regimes in Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia.
Then there is the burgeoning global movement against corporate-driven
globalization, which has, in the last year and a half, fused with the
anti-war movement to form a powerful anti-US front at the level of international
civil society. Like the Islamic fundamentalist movement, elements of this
diverse movement are likely to assume state power in a number of countries
in the coming years. Indeed, they already have in a number of Latin American
countries—in Brazil, Venezuela, and Ecuador.
Islamic fundamentalism and the anti-corporate globalization movement will
not mainly function to add diplomatic and material weight to the containment
of the US. What they will do is something equally important though, and
that is to erode the legitimacy of the American enterprise and expose
it for what it is: a naked bid for hegemony. This is critical since the
staying power of hegemons is ultimately based on the perception of their
legitimacy.
The next few years and decades are likely to witness ever more brazen
efforts to reorder the world to better serve US interests. But they will
also consolidate an anti-US coalition of the less powerful while accelerating
the spread of anti-US movements in global civil society. This is not the
unchallenged hegemony that Washington aspires for, but the classic dynamics
of overreach, of overextension. For if there is one unambiguous lesson
in the history of nations, it is that empire is transient while resistance
is permanent.
*Professor
of sociology and public administration at the University of the Philippines
and executive director of Focus on the Global South, a Bangkok-based analysis
and advocacy institute.
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