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ASSESSMENT OF DOHA: Part II of the final issue of Focus on Trade for 2001 contains articles by Walden Bello, Raj Patel, Aziz Choudry and Victor Menotti on what happened in Doha, why it happened, and how we should respond.

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LEARNING FROM DOHA

By Walden Bello*

(Composite article based on the author's two presentations at the meeting of the "Our World is Not for Sale Coalition," Brussels, Belgium, Dec. 7-9, 2001.)

How should we characterize the outcome of the World Trade Organization ministerial in Doha? I am not sure if a debate on whether or not a new round of trade negotiations was launched in Doha will lead us very far. But something very threatening occurred in Doha and that is what we must urgently convey to the world, which at the moment is very confused as to what its outcomes really were.

THREE KEY OUTCOMES

Three outcomes of Doha must be emphasized.

One, Doha put the World Trade Organization (WTO) back on its feet after the disaster in Seattle. C. Fred Bergsten, a prominent partisan of the WTO, once said that the WTO is like a bicycle: it collapses if it does not move forward. By agreeing on a declaration giving momentum to new negotiations for liberalization, the Doha meeting got the bicycle upright and moving again. Mike Moore, the director general, was not exaggerating when he thanked the ministerial for "saving the WTO."

Two, what resulted from Doha may not be a new round in the sense of immediate negotiations on a wide range of issues, but it was a major step toward further liberalization. First of all, the Doha declaration affirmed ongoing negotiations on certain existing

agreements, such as agriculture and GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) and opened negotiations to review other existing agreements, like the anti-dumping agreement. Second, it launched negotiations for new agreements, for instance, on industrial tariffs. Third, and perhaps most ominous, by putting them as the centerpiece of the declaration, Doha gave momentum to the eventual launching of negotiations to bring new, non-trade areas within WTO jurisdiction. These are the so-called "new" or "Singapore issues" of investment, competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation.

Three, Doha was a clear setback for the developing countries, most of whom had wanted to focus the ministerial and its aftermath on resolving outstanding issues of implementation from the Uruguay Round, of which there are at least 104 according to the Group of 77. The declaration simply acknowledged these concerns and outlined a vague process for their resolution. Indeed, even in key areas of implementation specified in the text, such as agriculture and textiles and garments, the developing countries came out as losers. The European Union managed to water down the Cairns Group's demand that there be a quick phase-out of agricultural export subsidies, and the US and other developed countries did not commit to an early removal of quotas on textile

and garment imports of critical importance to the developing countries.

It is important to stress that the South lost out in Doha because much of the influential Northern press has been saying that Doha proves that the developing countries can win in WTO negotiations. The Doha resolution of the TRIPs (Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights) and public health issue is often cited to prove this. Now it is certainly true that this was a step forward for the developing countries. However, it is important not to exaggerate its significance. The statement that "Nothing in the TRIPs Agreement shall prevent Members from measures to protect public health" is a political statement. There is nothing in the Doha compromise that commits members to change the text of TRIPs—which was, in effect, a victory for the US position. Even the Economist, an untiring promoter of the idea that the WTO is good for the developing countries, has had to admit, "the declaration is political and not legally binding." This is important since in the long run it is the legal text that counts, and it will be the basis on which the pharmaceuticals may sue developing countries when they deem the political climate more favorable.

QUALIFYING DEFEAT

Doha was a defeat for the developing world. It is nevertheless important to realize that the developing countries went to Doha much better prepared than they were for previous ministerials, partly owing to the "capacity-building" work of civil society groups based in Geneva. The

united front of a big block of developing countries who were against the new issues did hold until the end, when it crumbled under the onslaught of terrific pressure from the Quad and other developed countries. True, in the end, India stood alone in active opposition, with the tacit backing—it must be noted—of a couple of other countries such as Cuba, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic. Nonetheless, the consciousness of common interests and the need of having a common strategy vis-à-vis the dominant trading powers is something that is greater now and it provides a good basis for common action in the hard months ahead.

CONTEXT AND TACTICS

Doha took place amidst conditions that were already unfavorable from the point of view of developing country interests. The September 11 events provided a heaven-sent opportunity for US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick and European Union Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy to step up the pressure on the developing countries to agree to the launching of a new trade round, invoking the rationale that it was necessary to counter a global downturn that had been worsened by the terrorist actions. The location was also unfavorable, Qatar being a monarchy where dissent could be easily controlled. The WTO Secretariat's authority over who would be granted visas to enter Qatar for the ministerial allowed it to radically limit the number of legitimate NGOs that could be present, thus preventing that explosive interaction of developing country resent-

ment and massive street protest that took place in Seattle.

Still, these factors would not have been sufficient to bring about an unfavorable outcome. Tactics mattered, and here the developing countries were clearly outmaneuvered in Doha. The methods employed by the European Union and the United States to split the South must be denounced and, as many participants in the Brussels meeting of the “Our World is Not for Sale Coalition” (7-9 December) have strongly urged, carefully documented. More important, they must be studied closely to better prepare the developing countries next time. Among these tactics the Brussels meeting highlighted the following:

- Pushing a highly unbalanced draft declaration and presenting it to the ministerial as a “clean text” on which there allegedly was consensus, thus restricting the arena of substantive discussion and making it difficult for developing countries to register fundamental objections without seeming “obstructionist.”

- Pitting officials from the capitals against their negotiators based in Geneva, with the latter being characterized as “recalcitrant” or “narrow.”

- Employing direct threats, as the United States did when it warned Haiti and the Dominican Republic to cease opposition to its position on government procurement or risk cancellation of their preferential trade arrangements.

- Buying off countries with goodies, as the European Union did when, in return for their agreeing to the final declaration, it assured countries in the ACP (Africa-Caribbean-Pacific) group that the WTO would respect the so-called “ACP Waiver” that would allow them to export their agricultural commodities to Europe at preferential terms relative to other developing countries. Pakistan, a stalwart among developing countries in Geneva, was notably quiet at Doha. Apparently, this had something to do with the US’s granting Pakistan a massive aid package of grants, loans, and debt reduction owing to its special status in the US war against terrorism. Nigeria had taken the step of issuing an official communique denouncing the draft declaration before Doha, but came out loudly supporting it on November 14—a flip-flop that is difficult to separate from the US’s coming up with the promise of a big economic and military aid package in the interim.

- Reinstating the infamous “Green Room” on November 13 and 14, when some 20 handpicked countries were isolated from the rest and “delegated” by the WTO secretariat and the big powers to come up with the final declaration. These countries were not picked by a democratic process, and efforts by some developing country representatives to insert themselves into this select group were rebuffed, some gently, others quite explicitly, as was the case with a delegate from Uganda.

- Finally, pressuring the developing countries by telling them that they

would bear the onus for causing the collapse of another ministerial, the collapse of the WTO, and the deepening of the global recession that would allegedly be the consequence of these two events.

Doha was a low point in the GATT-WTO’s history of backroom intimidation, threats, bribery, and non-transparency. But take it from the horse’s mouth itself: no less than the EU’s Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, described the Doha process as “medieval.” There are no records of the actual decision-making process in Doha because the formal sessions of the ministerial—which is where decision-making is made in a democratic system—were reserved for speeches, and the real decisions took place in informal groupings whose meeting places kept shifting and were not known to all. There being no records, there is little accountability and the principals in any deals can deny that they engaged in questionable behavior.

A FRAGILE RECOVERY

The bicycle is upright, but it is still wobbly, and one of the reasons is that there lingers great resentment among developing countries of the whole non-transparent process of bamboozling them into accepting a declaration running counter to their interests. The WTO’s crisis of legitimacy is not over, and the non-transparency and lack of democracy so evident in Doha may yet deepen it.

Also adding to the resentment is the EU’s Agricultural Commissioner’s post-Doha declaration that the watering down of the

statement on the phasing out of agricultural export subsidies was a “victory” for the EU—which many have taken to mean that the EU will fight tooth and nail to keep the subsidies in the coming agricultural negotiations.

There was also Washington’s recent decision to slap tariffs of up to 40 per cent against steel imports, allegedly to counter dumping activities but really to save their already highly protected steel industry. Coming shortly after Doha, this is now seen by other countries as an indication that Washington is not serious about the renegotiation of the anti-dumping agreement it agreed to in Doha and is intent on continuing to use its anti-dumping mechanisms to prevent market access not only in steel but in textiles, garments, and agricultural commodities.

Then there is the deepening global recession, which stems to a great extent from the indiscriminate integration and interlocking of economies brought about by trade liberalization. In both North and South, there are emerging strong domestic pressures to protect and salvage industries, creating a global climate that is increasingly hostile to further trade liberalization.

These factors make the Doha outcome a fragile one, and a key part of our task is find a way of bringing them together in an effective way in the coming months to reverse the Doha dynamic.

THE CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT: A KEY POINT OF CONTENTION

Having pointed to these “mitigating” factors, we must emphasize that they merely mitigate what is a position of strategic disadvantage for us, from which we need to extricate ourselves. But as Martin Khor noted, NGOs fight best when they have their backs against the wall. In this regard, one of the most promising weapons is the Chairman’s statement on negotiations on the new issues, which will be the main area of contention. The Chairman’s statement appended to the final declaration, which was issued to end India’s opposition to the document, reads:

“Let me say that with respect to the reference to an ‘explicit consensus’ being needed, in these paragraphs, for a decision to be taken at the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference, my understanding is that, at that session, a decision would indeed need to be taken by explicit consensus, before negotiations on trade and investment and trade and competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation could proceed.

“In my view, this would also give each member the right to take a position on the modalities that would prevent negotiations from proceeding after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference until that member is prepared to join in an explicit consensus.”

I agree with those who say that the future of the new issues will depend on how

much weight will be attached to the Chairman’s statement and whose interpretation will win out. At a meeting we had with European Commission officials right after our Brussels review, on December 10, Philippe Meyer, head of the Unit on Investments of the EC’s Directorate-General for Trade, stated that he was glad that the WTO members “had agreed to launch negotiations on investment.” This was, in my view intentional, and part of a strategy to obscure the fact that both the Chairman’s statement and the Doha Declaration itself state that negotiations will not be launched until after the Fifth Ministerial in 2003 and only after there is an explicit consensus to launch negotiations.

Given this not-too-subtle offensive to define the process, it is important for our side to loudly insist at every possible forum that: 1) negotiations cannot start until after the Fifth Ministerial; 2) that negotiations can take place only if there is an explicit consensus drawn from each and every country to undertake them; 3) that, as the Chairman’s statement makes clear, the absence of an explicit consensus to start negotiations from even one member-country will be sufficient to keep negotiations from proceeding; and 4) that the Chairman’s statement carries the same legal weight as the Doha Declaration.

THE MISSING LINK

Let me move on to some comments about civil society and Doha. Civil society was present in Doha in the form of some 60 representatives of genuine—as opposed to business and government-controlled—NGOs. Their impact was, however, greater than their numbers, with this band of hardy souls staging demonstrations and direct actions right in the convention site, in a direct challenge to both the Qatari and WTO authorities!

In comparison to Seattle, the protests this time around were really global, taking place in some 40 countries on November 10-11 and mobilizing hundreds of thousands of people. This show of solidarity against corporate-driven globalization was impressive, but, unfortunately, like the protests at the Doha Sheraton, it hardly made a dent on the Doha process.

Maude Barlow of the Council of Canadians has said that massing on the streets in one location might no longer work in the future since the multilaterals have learned their lessons from Seattle and are likely to hold their get-togethers in isolated, distant sites. Doha certainly proved the success of this strategy. Nevertheless, as Maude would definitely agree, we cannot give up the streets, and must, in fact, make greater efforts to assert our right to them in the coming period, as governments and police seek to restrict the rights of the

anti-globalization movement under the guise of opposing terrorists.

Despite the outcome of Doha, one cannot emphasize too strongly the impact of the patient efforts of many groups in our coalition to assist developing country delegations in Geneva to gain a better technical and political understanding of WTO issues and processes. Among the fruits of this cooperation was the proposal to attach a “Development Box” to the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), which would exempt countries from undertaking liberalization measures mandated by the WTO in order to achieve food security and development objectives.

But the collapse of most of the developing countries at Doha owing to intense pressure from the Quad and other developed countries showed up the limitations of the street protest-cum-Geneva lobby approach. As Raphael Alegria, Mariama Williams, and other participants in the Brussels meeting regularly pointed out, there is a missing element and that is the consistent pressure from social movements on their governments. There is simply no alternative to movements on the ground, in country after country, putting their governments’ feet to the fire. Unless this vacuum is filled, the next ministerial will be a repeat of Doha.

Our work is really cut out for us, and we have only 15 to 18 months before the Fifth Ministerial to get our act together: formulating and setting into motion a strategy that innovatively brings together the protests in the streets, intense delegation-by-delegation lobbying in Geneva, and massive grassroots pressures on governments at home.

SUMMARY

In summary, the main lessons from the Doha debacle are, in my view:

- Doha set the bicycle of WTO-directed global trade liberalization upright and back into motion.
- Doha was a defeat for developing countries, though they went into the ministerial with a greater consciousness of common interests and greater degree of unity than in the past.

- The September 11 context and the site of the ministerial mattered, but it was the dirty high-pressure tactics of the US and the EU in a non-transparent and non-democratic process that was principally responsible for the outcome.

- The developed countries' victory at Doha is, however, a fragile one that may be unravelled by the combination of continuing developing country resentments at the non-transparent process, refusal of the EU and the US to live up to their commitments in the declaration, and growing resistance to further liberalization in both North and South triggered by the accelerating and deepening global recession.

- The main front of battle in the coming months will be the new issues, and the weight given to Chairman's statement appended to the declaration and its interpretation will be a key factor determining the outcome.

- Civil society intervention will continue to be an extremely critical factor, and the outcome of the next ministerial and the whole struggle against indiscriminate liberalization will depend on the emergence of what is now the missing link: social movements that mobilize to prevent their national governments from making destructive concessions. What can make the difference is an innovative strategy that combines street protests, the Geneva lobbying, and grassroots pressures on home governments in a coordinated fashion.

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THEY ALSO MAKE BOMBS OUT OF PAPER

Raj Patel*

"A little fertilizer, some bleach and some hubcaps to put them all in, and you've got a bomb", he said. "You can use frozen orange juice and slugs instead of bleach, if you haven't got any", he added helpfully. Sean, a 13 year-old neighbourhood fund of wisdom, confided secrets to me that he had cribbed from his father's Anarchist's Cookbook.

Being only nine years old, I was awed that he'd deign to talk to me at all, let alone tell me how to make a bomb. Sean moved away a few weeks later, and I've not heard from him since. His most germane advice, though, remains with me: "With half a mind and if you try hard enough, you can make a bomb out of anything."

A fertilizer bomb that kills hundreds in Oklahoma. Fuel-laden civil jets that kill 4000 in New York. A sanctions policy that kills one and a half million in Iraq. A trade policy that impoverishes continents. You can make a bomb out of anything. The ones on paper hurt the most.

Tucked away in the news in mid-November was a snippet from the Middle East directly related to the 'War on Terrorism,' but one that didn't get quite as much coverage as it ought to have done. The World Trade Organization held

its Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, and came away with a Ministerial Declaration fluttering in its hand. United States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, peddled the Ministerial Conference as part of the war effort. Here's what he said: "America's ability to sustain coalitions against terrorism will depend in part on our attention to the problems faced by our partners. Many democratic governments in developing nations, already struggling with economic challenges before September 11, now face staggering difficulties."

That these difficulties are due to the previous trade rounds and to developing countries' increased, policed and enforced integration into America's global economy, seems temporarily to have escaped Mr Zoellick. As ever, beneath the veneer of US magnanimity writhes a tangle of less noble intentions. The new Doha Development Agenda has much in common with its noisier cousin, The War on Terrorism. It is warfare by other means against the poor, at home and abroad.

Indeed, the weapons of war seem to have informed the negotiating strategy of the WTO's handlers. One of the most dazzling early innovations from the

arms industry was to pack a brace of warheads, including some dummies, atop intercontinental ballistic missiles. When these warheads re-enter the atmosphere, the enemy's defences are spread so thin trying to pick off each individual bomb that at least one would be sure to get through. And one warhead is quite enough.

So it is with the development agenda. As Barry Coates, Director of the World Development Movement notes "Developing countries have neither the capacity nor the wish to negotiate these new agreements." The civil services in the poorest countries have been pared to the bone by World Bank structural adjustment policies. Many cannot afford to have even one delegate in Geneva to monitor, negotiate and resist these organisations. Negotiating several issues at once is well beyond the means of most poor countries. The mere demand that these wrecked diplomacies 'negotiate' a cluster of new issues effectively guarantees their detonation.

Why, then, did developing countries agree to sign? Part of the reason lies in the magic of advertising. The new round hasn't been called a 'round.' Instead what we have is a new brand round, the "Doha Development Agenda". This rebranding idea is one with which we are all familiar - you tinker with the name, but nothing else, in order to make punters believe

that you've actually improved things. It has worked for corporate giants, it works for the US government. The re-branded School of the Assassins in Fort Benning Georgia is now catchily known as WHISC, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, but it still trains Latin American officers in techniques of interrogation to be tried out on uncooperative citizens back home. *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.* Flushed with the success of this little public relations coup, the US government and its corporate sponsors transformed the new WTO round into a Development Agenda. True to the spirit of the exercise, it still looks and smells the same as past efforts. And it comes with no added developing country concerns either.

If you were following the flurry of trade debate emails, your spirits might have been raised a little with the announcement that developing countries won a major concession from rich countries. The Doha declaration on TRIPS - Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights - says that public health concerns can trump patents on drugs. A variety of non-governmental organizations in Doha rejoiced. It seemed as if the WTO had effectively condoned the exporting of cheap medicines to developing countries most in need of them. This seemed to be an important concession, an article of good faith

on the part of the rich concerned with the 'difficulties' of their poorer brethren.

A more sober reading of the text of the declaration soon re-corked the Champagne™. It turns out that the declaration merely clarifies existing provisions in the WTO patents regime, in which public health criteria can already be used to abrogate patent rights. There's nothing new in the Doha declaration to worry the pharmaceutical companies, as PhRMA, the US Pharmaceutical corporate lobby, have recently confirmed. In fact, the WTO's rules are so powerful that even rich countries are wary of them. Nothing else explains the Canadian government's swift about-face on the compulsory licensing of Cipro. If the Canadians are afraid because of the precedent this will set for the pharmaceutical industry, it's unlikely that small developing countries stand much of a chance. Only Brazil has moved ahead with a compulsory licensing initiative, despite US threats of legal action. To have the rich countries affirm what was written into an already unjust law is scant victory.

Christmas has come early for the sick in poor countries. And, yep, they got a kick in the teeth. Again.

None of this answers the question of why developing countries agreed to sign the declaration. Developing countries aren't so easily beguiled.

After all, they knew that the WTO allowed for compulsory licensing in the public interest. What's going on?

Well, one reason for the signing isn't big news: since so little was given away, there was plenty of room to be able to spin the results to everyone's benefit. At a time when the big players in international politics are looking for dividends, no matter how empty, this was a fine chance to 'reinject confidence' into the international system. The Indian government was able to trumpet their international belligerence to a domestic audience in need of feel-good news. Meanwhile the EU and US were able to brush aside demands on agricultural subsidy reduction, re-evaluating TRIPS and implementation issues. The rich still haven't delivered on many of the promises they made in 1994.

Another compelling argument for the signing of the declaration is the liberal application of carrots and sticks to the delegates. In order to maintain their coalition against terrorism, the US and its allies have brought their external considerations of aid budgets, trade opportunities and debt forgiveness to bear with unusual vigour. Which developing country, choking on immense and illegitimate debt, wouldn't like to be a Pakistan right now, on the receiving end of international largesse, World Bank and IMF debt cancellation, and

CNN's compassion?

Which developing country, not necessarily among the 70 listed by Donald Rumsfeld, would like to be Afghanistan? Yash Tandon, a seasoned activist from the SEATINI group in Harare, put it like this: "In Seattle, they had green rooms. In Doha they had boiler rooms. The rich countries lined up the poor, and took them in one by one, twisting their arms and extracting concessions with the threats of reduced aid budgets or worse."

The pressure on developing countries, the strong 'No to a new round' positions taken by developing countries, and the pressure on the North to come out with some sort of agreements made possible a number of feats of diplomatic prestidigitation. Consider this example: the EU and its former colonies in the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) are party to the Cotonou agreement. Cotonou grants a series of preferential trade privileges to exporters in these countries. These privileges, as the recent dispute over bananas shows, are questionably compatible with the WTO's most-favoured nation stipulations. The ACP countries had been pushing hard for a waiver, so that these meager preferences would be accepted by the WTO. As if by magic, the WTO agreed.

The real reasons are a little less impressive. It would have been excep-

tionally awkward to refuse this relatively small concession in a 'development round.' The ACP countries have until 2008 to become WTO compliant in any case, there had been a great deal of campaigning and lobbying around this issue before Doha and – to top it off – the EU was made to appear magnanimous. Magic looks better, though. The waiver has been spun as a concert of Northern and Southern interests.

The Indian government, the most initially intransigent and powerful developing country, demanded a caveat before signing the Doha declaration. They wanted clarification from the Chair of the Conference, Youssef Kemal, on whether signing the agreement actually committed *everyone* to a new round, or merely to talks about talks. Here's Mr Kemal's reply.

"Let me say that with the respect to the reference to an 'explicit consensus' being needed, in these paragraphs, for a decision to be taken at the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference, my understanding is that, at that Session, a decision would indeed need to be taken, by explicit consensus, before negotiations on Trade and Investment and Trade and Competition Policy, Transparency in Government Procurement, and Trade Facilitation could proceed. In my view, this would give each Member the right to take a position on modalities that would prevent negotiations

from proceeding after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference until that Member is prepared to join in an explicit consensus."

Poor Mr Kemal. Beyond being forced to talk in this unutterable doublespeak, he's clearly someone under duress. Things that you say with a gun to your head often don't count against you under more normal circumstances. And since the Indian government was asking for this clarification minutes before the end of the conference, and given that Youssef Kemal had spent a great deal of time working to make sure that the conference resulted in some sort of declaration, it's not terribly surprising that he agreed to whatever they said. The subtext here is quite simple: "Yeah, whatever, for the love of god just sign the damn thing". Can we expect a process of explicit consensus next time round? It is, at best, unlikely. The WTO has a track record of promises broken to the South. From implementation protocols ignored, to preliminary 'studies' before negotiations waived, it is standard diplomatic practice to throw crumbs to developing countries at one negotiation, and then pick them off the table with a damp middle finger at the next.

Perhaps the best explanation as to why developing countries went ahead with the round, though, is that the mystery rests on a misconception. In

Seattle, Southern governments refused to sign a declaration not because they opposed the entrenchment of neoliberalism and the elite class bias that comes with it, but because they had been roughly treated. Delegates had not been able to enter meetings, and the US negotiating team had rubbed Southern inferiority in their faces. In other words, the signing of the Doha Development Agenda is only a mystery if one thinks that developing country governments have recently taken a principled stand against neoliberalism. They haven't. The refusal to sign at Seattle was not about indignation at neoliberalism, but about the failure to treat elites as they are accustomed.

In Doha, by contrast, Mr Zoellick was a dealer, a broker of accord, a merchant of consensus. This new-found humility evidently pushed the buttons of the developing country elite. So they signed. This should come as no surprise. These are the elites that milk and pimp the majority of people in their countries. It's hard to see why putting them in five star accommodation and making them feel important might make them less venal.

Let us be clear. The Doha declaration and the war on terrorism are one and the same process of power politicking. And woe betide those who raise their voices in protest. Violence and silence are partners. Indeed, the 'war on

terrorism' and the 'war on poverty' even have similar processes of suppression of dissent. It has, for example, been little reported that the WTO tried to muffle an alternative website. The operators of Gatt.org were told by their internet service provider, after pressure was applied from the WTO, that they had to take the site down because of copyright violations. Using a slightly outdated facsimile of the WTO's own website, the site provides links to alternative sources of information on the WTO, as well as a modest character assassination of trade-unionist turned Director General of the WTO, Mike Moore. Clearly, someone at the WTO doesn't have a sense of humour. And wants alternatives silenced.

Fact is, trade has as little to do with development now as it did when the British South Africa Company, and the Dutch and British East India companies smothered Africa and Asia. The WTO continues to reach beyond any reasonable economic arguments about trade with its 'Trade Related' intellectual property, labour, and transparency rulings. That's okay. We're used to it. The war on terrorism has, as John Pilger has noted, nothing to do with terrorists.

Both the international trade system and the war on terrorism are technologies of entrenchment. We are sold war as patriotism. We are sold trade as efficiency.

Efficiency is the Trojan horse of fascist politics. On the surface, the idea seems inviting enough - get more for your money than you currently get. This is the magic of international trade liberalisation, after all. Let consumers reap the benefits of cheap production in other places, stop subsidising your own wasteful production. You can even give the money you save from subsidies to widows and orphans.

Not that the winners from 'efficiency' seem to care about widows, or indeed any women at all. Perhaps the greatest crime in the drive to efficiency, as with the drive to 'international security' is the silence over the suffering of women. In the production of tea, coffee, cocoa, textiles, services and agricultural innovation, the most exploited are people of colour, and above all women.

That's not entirely fair. Free traders do have a thing or two to say about women. The stylized argument is this:

"Look! These peasant women, who previously didn't have an income, are now able to earn cash, if only in the informal economy! Not only does trade continue to liberate, but also it always has. Some women have benefited from trade for centuries. Cross border trade in the horn of Africa, for instance, puts women in a position of slightly more power than their counterparts elsewhere

in Africa."

But there's a sleight of hand, a twist of a dagger in this. Rural communities involved in the export industry are on a guaranteed losing streak. The price of the goods they sell has fallen over the past thirty years - indeed, the market guarantees that when demand is high, supply will rise to lower price in the long term. And to supply, all you need is to be in debt, have a tropical climate, and cheap labour. Any takers?

In other words, the prices of these things, the very things that are meant to lift the poor out of poverty, plummeted. Disenfranchised, the rural poor migrated to the city. And since there really isn't a way to grow much food there, working for cash for food became a necessity. And with some fine modeling, the informal economy has been illuminated for us. And women are now cash-rich. Development? Exactly.

Efficiency is not a democratic value. (It's hardly accidental that 'efficient' is a nineteenth century term for a soldier ready for combat.) Efficiency is a technology of conservatism. It is a way of asking how to wring more out of the status quo. If the status quo were just, efficiency would be a luxury we could afford to think about. But it isn't. Efficiency is an entrenchment. This is the sort of

entrenchment that has been peddled under the lobotomising slogan "If we don't do X, the terrorists have already won" where X is exactly the same as we did before. This is the sort of conservatism that does a disservice to Conservatism. It is reactionary, mindless and stupefying. We must remain the same not because change must happen slowly, but because any change lets terrorists win.

The war on terrorism isn't really about preventing the savage acts that kill thousands every day. Trade isn't really about development. They're both ways of entrenching power, making the world safe for capital, in our names, written into the laws of our countries.

The connection with law - and the majority of the WTO's employees are lawyers - is important. 'Trade as development' and 'War as peace' snap the connection between law and justice. The laws invoked to sanctify these power politics are vastly unjust, and an example of the kind of justice that people of colour experienced for a while. Apartheid, after all, had its legal justifications. It was written on peoples' bodies just as it was written in statute. The law is a weapon of the strong far more than a weapon of the weak.

Sometimes, though, paper can become inconvenient for even the most powerful. The rule of law can turn into the

rile of law for the rich as much as for the poor. The solution? Ignore it. This is what the US has done to its own constitution and trade commitments over the past decade. The constitution has finally made the transition from parchment to toilet paper. John Ashcroft's ransacking of attorney-client privilege, allowing him to monitor attorney-client interactions without telling anyone, violates both the Fourth and Sixth amendments.

Let no-one say that all it takes to kill one of these outrages is 'open democratic debate'. There is no such thing. The self professed home of democracy is run on the dollar-a-vote principle. Such politics rests on our consent, though. When we withhold it, we reclaim the power that is justly ours. It's important to remember that the battle against the corporatisation of medicine was won not in Doha, but through large-scale international mobilization, education and protest. The declaration on public health was a forgone conclusion only after a great deal of hard work by groups like the Treatment Action Campaign and ActUp! Philadelphia, Paris and New York. The victory is well worth the struggle, but is far from over. After all, the horror of 'international trade as development' still remains. We should not forget that we've only won what was taken away from us by the WTO in the first instance. And when we

roll back the police state in the US and elsewhere, we'll only be reclaiming the liberty that was snatched from us.

It is time for a healthy dose of pessimism of the intellect. There are tough times ahead. In many places around the world, an article like this could constitute criminal incitement. You can make a bomb out of paper. As the Gandhians among us know, you can also make a weapon out of truth. To update Orwell, telling the truth is now a terrorist act. So if we don't become guerrillas armed with truth, satyagrahi? Well, then the real terrorists have already won.

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POWER IS NOTHING WITHOUT CONTROL

By Aziz Choudry*

"Power is nothing without control" reads an advertising billboard for a multinational tyre company close to Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. Walking past it on the final days of the World Trade Organisation ministerial meeting in Qatar, Pirelli's slogan rang true for the way in which the major powers manipulate the rules of world trade in their own economic and political interests.

Visiting the country of incoming WTO Director General, former Thai Deputy Prime Minister Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi I was struck by some parallels between New Zealand and Thailand. On November 9, two days before I went to Thailand, I attended a march and rally against the WTO in Christchurch, Mike Moore's hometown. At the same time over 1500 Thai farmers, unionists, and HIV/AIDS activists marched on the US Embassy in Bangkok. There, villagers burnt chili and salt – a ritual which locals say brings bad luck to bad people. The demonstration called for the WTO to get out of agriculture and an end to the patenting of life and drugs.

Supachai takes over from Mike Moore next September. In Bangkok I asked trade unionists, academics, journalists and others what they thought about the

changing of the guard at the WTO. One unionist told me that he could not see that having a Thai as the figurehead at the WTO would make any difference at all for Thailand or the rest of the Third World. "He will just be a puppet for the powerful countries like the USA" which dominate the WTO. A researcher said that Supachai is a "smooth operator" – a far more polished performer than Mike Moore, and a respected economist with a PhD in development economics from Rotterdam. Moore has irritated many Third World governments by his consistent unwillingness to listen to their concerns about the impacts of trade and investment liberalization on their countries.

Thai farmers are outraged that germ of Thailand's famous jasmine rice is in the hands of US researchers. Jasmine rice grows well in drought conditions and saline soils so it suits farming conditions of North East Thailand. Most of it is produced by five million farmers whose meagre livelihoods depend on it. According to Deputy Commerce minister Suvarn Valaisathien, the Thai government is preparing for a legal action aimed at preventing a US rice breeder from patenting a new rice variety being developed from genetic

material from Thai jasmine rice. But those I spoke with doubted whether the Thai government would really act.

Concerns about the WTO include the way in which TRIPS - its intellectual property agreement - strengthens the hand of private companies in claiming monopoly rights and getting huge benefits from biopiracy. Private sector researchers, agribusiness and pharmaceutical corporations are appropriating indigenous communities' heritage for private profit, while those who developed and nurtured them receive no benefits. Many Maori also oppose such practices and the patenting of life. No commitment to change this controversial agreement was made at Doha

Also present at the Bangkok anti-WTO protest were unionists from Thai International protesting at the restructuring and further privatisation of the airline. Privatisation was a key condition of the IMF's US \$17.2 billion aid package to bail out Thailand after the 1997 crisis, caused largely by financial liberalization. At a roundtable session with independent trade unionists and labour activists last week, State Railway Workers Union of Thailand officials asked me about the effects of privatizing New Zealand Rail on communities and workers. An Australian company is poised to buy Thailand's Railways. Rail privatizations

in New Zealand, Britain and Australia have been held up as success stories to sell the idea. Many Thais are already painfully aware of what comes with privatizing state-owned assets - mass layoffs, higher prices, and less access to public services for the poor - in a country where there are no social safety nets.

Whatever emerged from Doha had to be sold to the world as a success for the WTO or else it would be condemned as an irrelevant forum, incapable of achieving anything.

US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick boasted: "We have removed the stain of Seattle" The Financial Times was far less upbeat: "Reaching a deal required so many compromises and caveats that the final agenda is almost meaningless." The key points of the Doha Declaration contradict the interests of developing countries. It seems that the Quad countries, the USA, the EU, Canada, and Japan, bludgeoned their way into making gains for their interests on almost every issue on the agenda.

At Seattle, Third World governments had resisted pressure to accept a trade agenda shaped primarily in the interests of the rich and powerful, scuttling a Millennium Round of trade talks. Internal divisions within the WTO were probably as marked going into the Doha meeting, if not

more so. But as one non-governmental observer put it, this meeting was characterized by "high-handed unethical negotiating practices of the developed countries - linking aid budgets and trade preferences to the trade positions of developing countries and targeting individual developing country negotiators". After all, what is power without control?

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FROM DOHA TO JOHANNESBURG: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE USURPED

The World Trade Organization's new mandate raises a key question for next year's UN World Summit on Sustainable Development: Who will decide our common future?

By Victor Menotti*

Exactly what was decided at the November 2001 WTO Ministerial in Doha is still unclear, even for the 144 governments who signed the final declaration. As of December, trade ministers continue arguing over whether or not the final declaration actually launches negotiations on the so-called Singapore issues (investment, competition, government procurement, and trade facilitation). If negotiation of these issues is recognized as officially launched, the WTO may soon be able to prevent citizens from using their governments to regulate foreign investment or to channel tax dollars toward poverty alleviation and conserving natural systems. Liberating global capital from serving the needs of people and nature would represent the ultimate triumph for the world trade body whose very mission is to exclude civil society from shaping economic systems. Launching negotiations on the Singapore issues would expand WTO's mandate to set global rules for both private investment and public spending, two key sources of financing development. If taken, these WTO decisions will have enormous influence over the outcomes of the 2002 United Nation's World Summit in Sustainable Development (WSSD, or Rio Plus Ten) in Johannesburg.

But even without the

Singapore issues, what has become increasingly clear is the realization that governments gathered in Doha handed the WTO an historic new mandate that will expand its powers over fundamental questions whose answers will ultimately define our common future. Unless civil society fights back, Doha will have resolved the question of global governance, with WTO becoming the arbiter of all things.

At the very least, the Doha agenda has empowered WTO to:

1. eliminate more conservation and community development policies as unfair "barriers" to trade;
2. intensify destructive export activities in forestry, fisheries, mining, fossil fuels, and other natural resources.
3. determine who gets the remnants of collapsing natural resources, starting with the world's depleted fisheries;
4. define, apparently unilaterally, its relationship with multilateral environmental agreements;

Below is an overview of the implications of the Doha agenda for the following issues: energy, fisheries and forestry

While the oil and gas sector is largely exempt from current WTO rules, the broader energy sector could be penetrated by WTO's proposed expansion. To understand how WTO

might cover the energy sector, it is useful to look at how other existing trade agreements have already handled the subject, as well as how proposed expansions of WTO powers could advance into energy.

ENERGY IN OTHER INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS

Most relevant are the rules established by the United States for Canada under the existing North American Free Trade Agreement. NAFTA is widely considered to be the "state of the art" in trade deals because it goes more deeply into restricting government powers than any other agreement to date. As Maude Barlow explains in the IFG Special Report "The Free Trade Area of the Americas," NAFTA removed Canada's control over its vast energy resources by:

- establishing rights for foreign companies to invest in the energy sector;
- stripping Canada's National Energy Board of its powers and dismantled the "vital-supply safeguard" that required Canada to maintain a twenty-five year surplus of natural gas (the US maintained its 25 year reserve for national security purposes);
- imposing a system of "proportional sharing" that guaranteed Canadian energy

supplies to the US, in perpetuity;

- lifting requirements for export applicants to file an impact assessment;
- banning export taxes (a major source of government revenue);
- banning preferential pricing for domestic customers.

As a result, Canada's exports to the US more than quadrupled in a decade while oil exports doubled. Now, President Bush is preparing to deepen access to Mexico's energy resources via expanded NAFTA talks. The US has also introduced this energy policy framework throughout the hemisphere, covering Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, via the so-called Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Building acceptance of this agenda in regional trade fora is important for introducing the topic, and similar agenda, at the global level in the WTO.

INCREASING FOSSIL FUEL USE BY EXPANDING WTO

WTO's could penetrate the energy sector by either creatively expanding existing agreements, or by introducing new subject areas for negotiation. Below are three negotiating themes (Services, Investment, and Competition) currently in the WTO, in which new rules over

energy and oil could expand to remove the ability of citizen's to use their governments to control the oil and gas industry.

ENERGY AND GATS

The General Agreement on Trade in Services, or GATS, is an existing accord in the WTO which is mandated to restrict government actions in a broad range of "services" via WTO-enforced trade sanctions. The WTO's current work plan calls for an expansion of GATS, and negotiators in Geneva have been proposing which sectors might be covered in an expanded set of rules.

Even before September 11, US President George W. Bush had made accessing new energy resources a top priority in his administration's new energy plan. The Bush White House has explicit plans to use GATS negotiations to widen access to gas and oil reserves. The key policy document (see www.bushenergy.com) laying out the policy goals and strategies reads, "The US has called upon WTO members to open markets eligible for private participation in the entire range of energy services, from exploration to the final customer. The energy service proposal would ensure non-discriminatory access to foreign provider energy services. Equally important, the US proposal suggests that WTO members consider how to create a pro-competitive regulatory environment for

energy services, so that opaque or discriminatory regulatory practices do not undermine their commitments to open their domestic markets to foreign service providers...The National Energy Policy Document (NEPD) group recommends that the President direct the Secretaries of Commerce, Energy, and the US Trade Representative, to support a sectoral initiative to expand investment and trade in energy-related goods and services that will enhance exploration, production, and refining, as well as the development of new technologies."

Canada has already submitted the following proposal to WTO Energy Services negotiations:

"oil and gas services include a wide range of services, such as: drilling services; derrick erection; repair and dismantling services; services necessary for oil or gas extraction such as well casing; cementing, pumping and plugging wells; as well as specialized fire extinguishing services...In addition to services incidental to mining, different related oil and gas services may be included in real estate services, rental/leasing services, technical testing and analysis services, services incidental to energy distribution, related scientific and technical consulting services, and construction and related engineering services..."

"Typical obstacles to trade in energy services include:

- restrictions for the entry and stay of energy services managers, professionals and experts;
- restrictions for the entry of the equipment and tools needed to provide the service;
- arbitrary business and licensing requirements; and
- absence of transparency of regulatory framework."

It is clear from GATS energy proposals such as the one above that nearly everything related to oil and gas is on the negotiating table in Geneva. One only needs to compare how these "services" compare with those of the world's largest players in the industry, such as Halliburton Energy Services, formerly overseen by Dick Cheney until he became Vice President in the Bush White House. Halliburton describes itself as a company whose "capabilities range from initial evaluation of producing formations to drilling, completion, production enhancement and well maintenance." Enron Corporation, another leading energy services giant, until its spectacular collapse in November 2001, also played a leading role in advising the Bush negotiators on how to advance the fossil fuels agenda via the WTO.

ENERGY AND INVESTMENT

The Bush energy plan goes on to say that, "The NEPD group recommends that the

President direct the Secretaries of State, Commerce, and Energy to use our membership in WTO to implement a system of clear, open, and transparent rules and procedures governing foreign investment, to level the playing field for US companies overseas and to reduce barriers to trade and investment."

A proposed expansion of WTO investment rules is an important, yet still disputed, part of the WTO's new Work Programme. Among other things, the new WTO investment agenda aims to:

- establish the right of foreigners to invest in any sector, including energy;
- establish the right of foreign investors to receive the same treatment as domestic companies, so-called National Treatment (which WTO currently applies only to goods and services, not investments) Any benefit offered to domestic companies, i.e., preferential tax breaks or interest free loans, would also have to be made available to foreign investors. Other restrictions, such as Venezuela's recent limits on joint ventures and foreign ownership would likely be banned;
- establish rights for foreign investors in the event of privatizing state-owned assets, whereby they would be offered terms no less preferable than those offered to domestic investors;
- ban performance

requirements, which are measures that make foreign investors leave on certain outcomes, such as retaining a portion of profits to be reinvested domestically, or operating for a minimum period of time.

An important question to ask in considering these issues is, for instance, how might major foreign investors gain new leverage over the country's control of its own energy supplies when new WTO investment rules are applied? Under the new WTO investment rules, authorities charged with regulating foreign investment, such as the Supreme Council on Investment in Saudi Arabia (who is currently bidding for WTO entry) or Venezuela's foreign investment review board, could become politically irrelevant.

ENERGY AND COMPETITION

WTO's competition agenda could eliminate government practices that protect national monopolies, both state owned and private, for example Petroleros de Venezuela, Mexico's PEMEX, or Aramco of Saudi Arabia. To promote competition, WTO would impose disciplines on what governments can and can not do, including activities of state-owned businesses, resulting in the break up. The benefits of exploiting those energy resources would be transferred from nations like Mexico and Venezuela to global energy corporations.

American and European energy companies would surely consolidate their power over these resources, making harder to challenge their manipulating the debates over global climate change.

FISHERIES

The world's fisheries are spiraling into total collapse due to overexploitation by industrial trawlers that literally mine the oceans. The European Commission says that at least 12 different fish stocks were now close to collapse and that dramatic cuts in quotas are imminent. Governments have finally acknowledged that their subsidies have played a central role in financing the enormous overcapacity in the industry. However, their plan to address what is arguably the planet's most advanced natural resource collapse is to extend WTO disciplines over the industry, incorporating various elements of the Doha agenda: expanding exports (tariff elimination), de-regulation (non-tariff measures) wider access to fisheries resources (competition), privatization of fishing quotas (investment), and scaling back government financing (Subsidies and Anti-Dumping).

The last item is of particular concern because it establishes a dangerous precedent for the WTO to become the arbiter of natural resource collapses and determine who will benefit from the remnants (See "Subsidies" below).

FISHERIES AND MARKET ACCESS

WTO's market access agenda combines two dangerous impacts that undermine sustainable fisheries: 1) the expansion of exports and consumption of fish whose stocks are possibly being depleted, and 2) the deregulation of legal protections that ensure the sustainability of fisheries and the local communities who survive off them.

1. **Tariff Elimination:** Lowering tariffs in the absence of adequate safeguards for marine ecosystems and fisher peoples will only accelerate the death spiral of the world's fisheries. No one has yet assessed the health impacts on species that are being prioritized for tariff elimination, yet day after day the UN Food and Agriculture Organization finds more bad news about dwindling stocks. Nor has anyone even consulted the fishing communities themselves, such as the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations in the US or the National Forum of Fishers in India, about what issues they want addressed in trade policy. It seems the only ones who are aware of the WTO fisheries agenda are the very importers, processors, and distributors who are driving the agenda for market access via the WTO. For them, eliminating tariffs would be tantamount to a tax cut on the goods they trade, with no guarantees that the savings get passed to consumers.

2. **Non Tariff Measures:** NTMs can be any government measure, policy, or practice that has the effect of "distorting" trade, such as harvesting restrictions, bans on destructive gear, embargoes on species suspected of disease, residency requirements (fish here, live here), or even ecolabels. APEC has already surveyed the various NTMs in Pacific Rim markets, with a view to taking it to WTO as a framework for negotiations on market access. Governments have yet to make this report public, as it could reveal a laundry list of regulatory measures being targeted for elimination via WTO negotiations. The NTM agenda is the final push to remove all government control from regulating fisheries, where any policy objective, such as resource conservation or community development, becomes subservient to expanding trade.

FISHERIES SUBSIDIES

This item on the Doha agenda, which at first glance may appear innocuous if not helpful, could turn out to be the tip of a corporate iceberg bound for capturing the remnants of the planet's collapsing resources. While governments absolutely need to cut subsidies and reduce overcapacity in the fishing industry (too many boats chasing too few fish), the WTO is not the appropriate venue to handle this subject. Letting a trade body, whose main constituents are global trading firms

and not people tied to the land and sea, decide which subsidies are allowable almost ensures that what happened with small farmers under WTO's last round will now be repeated with the world's small fishers.

Beyond WTO's well-documented history of cutting subsidies for the poor while further enriching the rich, the true WTO agenda for fisheries subsidies is revealed by who has been at the table in the discussion to date. Attempts by national networks of fisher peoples organizations to get to the table have been ignored, while the US trade association of importers, processors, and distributors (the National Fisheries Institute) has long been an official advisor to US trade negotiators. Few NGOs wanted to give the WTO anything that would expand its powers over new areas of policymaking, let alone allow WTO to greenwash its image. Yet that is exactly the spin out of Doha, as WTO claims a "win-win" for trade and environment.

The World Wildlife Fund seemed to play the leading role in putting fisheries subsidies on the WTO agenda, despite being informed repeatedly of the concerns of small fishermen's organizations.

The Doha text inserts the subject of fisheries subsidies under the section calling for the strengthening of the Agreements on Subsidies and Countervailing

Measures (Anti-Dumping). But it has no explicit conservation mandate, nor even an implied one. Indeed, its only specific directive is the "taking into account the importance of this sector to developing countries," which likely signals an orientation toward maximizing exports of fish products from poor countries, where, not coincidentally, rich countries are increasingly investing in fisheries because they have over-fished their own territories.

Subsidies disciplines via WTO is a subject also being considered by other natural resource industries, including forestry. The US forest industry has already asked the American government to document the role of subsidies in the global industry, building the case that other nations enjoy an unfair advantage. Depending on how the fisheries subject develops, other industries may be encouraged or discouraged from introducing their agenda into WTO. One can compare it to asking hedge fund managers to design a new architecture for global finance. This prospect is precisely the danger of giving the WTO new mandates to sort out ecological crises that have been the direct results of export-oriented development policies.

FISHERIES AND INVESTMENT

One of the most rapidly advancing domestic policies for dealing with

depleting fisheries is the creation of so-called Individual Transfer Quotas. ITQs' effectively privatize fisheries, making possible an enormous concentration of resources if combined with the WTO's investment agenda. By dividing up the allowable catch of a fishery into quotas, and giving individuals the right to either catch those fish or sell the rights to someone else who will. Many fishing communities, especially small fisher people, criticize ITQs because they privatize the catch and concentrate resources in the hands of the one with the most purchasing power, which can often be a multinational enterprise. In some places where ITQs are being implemented at the nation level, parliaments are attaching conditionalities to ensure large players do not swallow up everyone's quota. But when WTO's investment agenda is applied, many of these conditionalities will become viewed as barriers to free investment that need to be eliminated. The safeguards that made fisheries privatization palatable at the national level could be made illegal in the global policy arena of WTO.

FISHERIES AND COMPETITION

Many nations still prevent foreign entities from fishing in domestic waters, either protecting them for local fisherpeople, or, more likely, for domestic industrial fishing operators who export, such as

in South Africa. WTO's competition agenda could break-up these domestic monopolies, removing local control to allow the entry of foreign fishing ships.

FORESTS

FORESTS AND MARKET ACCESS

Tariffs: One of the issues of great concern to protesters in Seattle was the Global Free Logging Agreement. Forest and trade campaigners succeeded in getting the USTR to publish its first ever environmental assessment of trade liberalization before 1999 Ministerial.

Non-Tariff Measures: NTMs are broadly defined as any measure that "distorts" trade. Even potentially distorting measures, such as eco-labels, are under the microscope for the impacts on trade. APEC has inventoried so-called NTMs in the forestry, fishery, and other sectors throughout the 34 nations of the Pacific Rim. The USTR plans to use this laundry list as a "negotiating framework" for market access talks in Geneva.

In the midst of Seattle's teargas and police riots, forest activists managed to extract a written commitment from the White House that forest conservation measures would be defended in trade negotiations. Not only does the Bush White House need to follow through with that promise but other governments need to take up similar positions,

less of cross-deregulation that will “discipline” everything from harvesting restrictions to residency requirements to endangered species protections.

Another fundamental question for all natural resource management is how to conserve ecosystems and livelihoods when one can not control what is entering and exiting the country? WTO’s Article XI (Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions, or QRs) prevents nations from limiting both the export and import of natural resources (either raw or processed). North America’s forests and forest workers are feeling the impacts of the QR ban. Canada’s rampant clearcutting, failure to enforce protections for fish habitat, absence of protections for endangered species, and subsidized timber from public lands make it nearly impossible for US producers to compete. As Canadian softwood exports flood the US (making up one-third of the US market), small US mills are being driven out of business while forcing the survivors to log even more recklessly. US measures to impose countervailing tariffs and quotas are being challenged by Canada in the WTO. If producers from a nation as rich and powerful as the US can not survive, how then are smaller (and often more responsible) producers in less powerful nations expected to survive. WTO’s ban on QRs punishes responsible

producers while rewarding the most destructive.

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